MEDIATING FISCAL CLIFFS
We’ve all been watching with dismay the seeming inability of the D.C. powers-that-be to come together and enact legislation that would benefit most Americans. Each side puts the blame for these impasses on the other; and while I have my own strong view of where the major responsibility lies, I’m also aware that there are few heroes or heroics anywhere in sight.
[FLASH! A few days ago, President Biden signed into law a bipartisan gun bill that had been hammered out in Congress following the Buffalo and Uvalde tragedies. “When it seems impossible to get anything done in Washington,” said the President, “we are doing something consequential.” If I had any real faith that the successful compromise negotiations conducted here were going to be widely replicated down the road on other less heart-wrenching policy matters facing Congressional standoff, I might withdraw this article; but I lack that faith and envision a likely retreat to the prior glorification of impasse – so I’m moving ahead with this piece.]
My subject today isn’t to sort out the current winners from the losers or even to discuss the present-day issues. Rather, it’s to give current credence to a quite similar situation that plagued the nation a decade ago, and to revivify what I’d hoped would be my own contribution to advancing the ball through introducing a new element into the structure. So, fasten your seatbelts and stick around for the saga . . . .
Calendar 2012 was the height of the year-end “fiscal cliff” drama in Washington – you remember that, don’t you? – with all the talk about “sequester”, the deficit and the debt ceiling, amidst fears of recession and big tax hikes for the middle class. My focus now, however, isn’t on the relative merits of the various disputes, but on how little was being done to close the differences (and, even worse, how much was being done to exacerbate the gaps).
At the time, James Stewart wrote a good article in The New York Times about the seeming futility of the bargaining going on between the parties – suggesting that they ought to undergo “a crash course in negotiating tactics” before they “embark on yet another round of contentious and seemingly dysfunctional tax and budget tactics.” Their leaders, he noted, have been “falling into some classic but avoidable pitfalls,” rather than trying to “achieve their most important goals without subjecting the financial markets, the American people and the global economy to yet another high stakes and damaging game of chicken.”
Stewart then consulted some negotiating experts for their advice on the situation. He quoted one as saying, “In each successive round of talks, they’ve expressed mounting anger and frustration, which only create huge and unnecessary obstacles to reaching an agreement.” Another authority criticized each party’s aim at “claiming a large portion of the pie. Give me everything or I walk. That’s a very aggressive approach and doesn’t foster creative deal-making at all.” And a third expert said, “So much of what we’re seeing is being driven by emotion, anger, frustration and feelings of betrayal . . . It doesn’t have to be so personal. Both sides need to take a deep breath, keep their eyes on the prize and focus on what will serve their party and the needs of the nation.”
Okay, so that was the situation then. Now step back and allow me to introduce myself into the circumstances.
After retirement in 1996 from the Skadden Arps law firm where my major activity for three decades had been in the area of mergers and acquisitions, I began my “second lawyering career” as a mediator of business disputes. A decade later, I found myself knee-deep in the 2008 Lehman Bros. bankruptcy, as a court-appointed mediator handling about 50 disputes over the next half-dozen years. In 2012 I wrote a book about my concept of the role of business mediator, entitled Anatomy of a Mediation – a Dealmaker’s Distinctive Approach to Resolving Dollar Disputes and Other Commercial Conflicts, published by the Practicing Law Institute (PLI).
After publication of my book, a number of friends suggested to me that my services would be useful in Washington during the then contemporary fiscal cliff drama – trying to get the parties together to make a deal. My usual reply was, thanks for the compliment, but no thanks. Still, when the plunge over the cliff was finally averted, although with clear indications that other similar crises lay ahead, I began to give some thought as to whether a mediator could actually be of assistance to lawmakers in resolving their major differences.
The result of this was that in January 2013 I drafted an article on the subject, discussing the positives and the difficulties of adopting a mediator’s approach to the D.C. blues. I recently ran across a copy of my original draft, and it stuck me that, almost a decade later, our national government’s ability to reach constructive accords on significant public policy matters had, if anything, regressed from the sorrowful shape it was in back then. I was also keenly aware that the issues I had raised in the draft article were as timely today as they were a decade ago.
So I have decided to publish the original draft article in my blog – for my friends and followers to read, and to reach their own conclusions as to the practicality of such a course. Following the text of the article, I will tell you what ultimately happened back then with my intervention.
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MEDIATING FISCAL CLIFFS AND SUCH
by Jim Freund
Since retiring as a lawyer 16 years ago, I’ve been mediating commercial disputes – helping adversaries resolve their dollar differences – and I recently wrote a book on the subject. So, during the year-end “fiscal cliff” drama, friends and acquaintances often greeted me with, “Hey, Jim, you ought to be down in Washington helping those guys reach a compromise.” To which I would smile, accept the implicit compliment, and move on to another subject.
Now, however, with things having calmed down somewhat – the immediate plunge over the cliff averted by a last minute compromise that garnered the necessary Congressional and Administration support – but with every indication that other similar policy-making crises (e.g., the debt ceiling) lie not far ahead, I’ve given some thought to the worthwhile question of whether a mediator could actually be of assistance to lawmakers in resolving their major differences.
My answer – with apologies to those who thrive on up-or-down sound bites – is a qualified yes. “Yes” because I believe there’s much of value a skilled mediator could bring to the badly bollixed present day Washington scene. “Qualified” because certain characteristics of that scene might well undermine any benefits the mediator can provide.
The Commercial Dichotomy
To put into perspective the potential value of mediation in a “cliff” setting, you first have to understand the role mediation plays in the business world.
Commercial negotiating activities can be roughly divided between making voluntary deals, on the one hand, and resolving disputes short of litigation on the other. To succeed, each requires the parties involved to negotiate compromise provisions they can ultimately shake hands on.
With most deals, there’s no need for a mediator to help the parties. Much of my professional life was spent as a mergers-and-acquisitions lawyer. We knew damn well what we were supposed to do when we got into the conference room with the other side’s lawyers, executives and investment bankers – our clients (and those on the other side) made it quite clear to all concerned that they wanted to see a deal get struck. Sell the business, sign the lease, ink the contract – whatever.
Moreover, we all recognized (including our clients) that some give and take would be required to accomplish this and that sometimes the negotiations might turn a little heated. But at least the parties didn’t start out mad at each other – they had no painful past history to overcome. And their mutual interest in getting the deal done exceeded anyone’s desire to have every point resolved in his favor. There were plenty of bargaining chips to move around – we rarely got hung up on “principles” – and the experienced hands among us knew how to bend without breaking. And happily, all this was being played out behind closed doors – the public would only be told what happened once the deal was struck.
And so, in most cases where the parties were strongly motivated to strike a deal, we succeeded in reaching agreement. And on the occasions when that didn’t occur, well, everyone just went home – no harm done, no recourse required, let’s get on to the next one.
Resolving disputes, though – that’s something else altogether. A is hotly claiming he’s been financially harmed by B’s actions (or inaction), B is denying the charge with equal fervor. The bad blood builds up – animosity and distrust hampering efforts to even begin a negotiation. Once the bargaining does start, each side’s self-righteousness as to the absolutist position it takes (over what’s usually an ambiguous contractual provision) get things off on a bad footing. In contrast to the get-it-done attitude of dealmakers, the adversaries are often ambivalent about the whole idea of whether or not to settle. And the naturally competitive lawyers – usually litigators – who handle these matters tend to reflect and magnify their clients’ contentious postures.
When the parties’ attempts to negotiate a resolution of the dispute fail, they don’t just go home (as in a busted deal) – rather, A initiates litigation against B. That creates the biggest hurdle in dispute resolution – the need to assess the litigation alternative against which any proposed settlement has to be measured. What’s the most likely outcome in court and how likely is it to occur? You can make an educated guess, but you never know for sure. And because the judge can’t whack up the dollars somewhere in the broad middle where a settlement has a chance of taking place, the negotiated resolution is bound to be at odds with the all-or-nothing litigation result.
There are many reasons why going to court is far from an ideal way of resolving a dispute. It’s expensive, time-consuming, and creates a good deal of angst. Worst of all, the parties are, in effect, outsourcing to the judge or jury the decision as to the outcome of the dispute – which they’ll try to influence but they can’t control. The result will be a win for one party and a loss for the other, even where (as is usually the case) the merits are much more balanced.
Enter the Mediator
So, that’s the point at which mediation comes into play – if and when the parties recognize that a compromise settlement each can live with would be more in their mutual interests than the negativism and uncertainty of a trial. Since they haven’t been able to achieve this settlement on their own, they engage a mediator to assist them in reaching agreement. There are many capable and experienced commercial mediators around – both male and female (For gender equality, I’ll use the feminine pronouns here and the masculine pronouns later on in D.C.)
The mediator has to be someone who’s strictly neutral as between the parties. Her only goal is to help them negotiate their compromise. The mediator will generally have views on the merits of the dispute and (if she’s like me) will express those views to the parties, to aid them in assessing the realities of the situation. But the mediator should be indifferent as to where such a compromise comes out – just so it satisfies the two side sufficiently that they’d rather shake hands on the negotiated terms than go to battle in court.
But even if the mediator comes up with a resolution that’s feasible for both sides to buy into, she can’t impose it on the parties. In this respect, the mediator is distinguishable from an arbitrator (with whom the mediator is sometimes confused), who is more like a judge – hearing the evidence and deciding the case on the merits, with a judgment that’s binding on the parties. All the mediator has going for her is the reality of her reactions as a neutral observer, the validity of her insights, and her powers of persuasion.
Yet it often works. The parties start out full of bombast, represented by litigators who approach the dispute with a winning (rather than compromising) mentality. The mediator serves, in the first instance, as a calming force. My own technique is to keep the parties in separate rooms and not communicating directly, so there’s little opportunity for the usual projectile-firing forays between them.
But the mediator’s biggest contribution is as what some term an “agent of reality” – making clear to the parties that the overheated positions they’re taking don’t form the basis for a compromise that both sides can accept, and then urging them to move more in the direction of each other. And, if this hasn’t worked out earlier, then in the endgame a mediator like myself often puts a proposal on the table that both sides can either accept or reject but not negotiate further.
The Fiscal and Other Cliffs
Now let’s shift the focus to what goes on cliff-wise in Washington (or at other venues where significant political matters are being hammered out). The people involved appear to be trying to make a deal – and they know how to make deals, since they do it all the time on lesser matters. So, why is it so much more difficult than making a business deal, and why could they use a mediator?
Well, one major reason is that while what they’re doing is masquerading as an attempt to make a deal, in reality it’s a deal that wraps in numerous trappings of a dispute.
There’s a disturbing amount of animosity and distrust – some of it historic bad blood, some ginned up for the occasion. The “other side” is viewed as the enemy, rather than as a collaborator in working out an effective compromise – and in crossing swords with enemies, the goal is unconditional surrender, which just doesn’t happen in either the political or commercial world. Everyone in Washington is busy taking non-negotiable positions (no tax hike, no decrease in benefits, etc.), posturing for their colleagues and constituents, attempting to seize bargaining advantage through public statements and media exposure. Individuals are self-righteous about the “enduring principles” their position asserts – a far cry from cutting a business deal, where we knew what the other guy could do with his principles, and told him so. It’s painful to say, but the scene inside the Beltway has more the aura of adversaries locked in mortal combat than of collaborators around a conference table poised to cut a deal.
Another respect in which the cliff negotiation is more like a dispute than a deal is the consequence of failing to reach agreement. As previously noted, in a business deal – let’s say, a corporate acquisition – if the parties fail to reach agreement, everyone just goes home – that’s the end of it. In a commercial dispute, however, if no accommodation is reached, the result is going to be litigation; and the likely results of that litigation (which no one knows for sure, but everyone has a view on) are what the potential accommodation has to be measured against. In the fiscal cliff negotiations, the consequences of failing to reach agreement were similarly dire, including big tax hikes for the middle class, the “sequester,” and fear of a recession – all of which furnished the template against which the feasible deal (“imperfect” in the view of all concerned) had to be measured.
All of this leads me to believe that mediation – so useful in resolving commercial disputes – might well be helpful in approaching the Washington deal-that’s-more-like-a-dispute. So let’s examine the possibilities, including the additional hurdles that would have to be overcome.
Concerning the Cliff Mediator
First, though, we have to figure out how a mediator could be in place. I don’t see this working on an ad hoc basis each time a crisis erupts. Rather, there would need to be established a high level post in Washington – a neutral mediator (whom we’ll call the “Cliff Mediator”) who’s on full-time standby to help in particular fractious circumstances, such as the fiscal cliff, which now seem like they’ll be erupting on a regular basis. The individual selected would have to be someone of impeccable credentials, who is not identified with either political party, nor with either branch of Congress – perhaps a retired judge who never voted in an election, and who also possesses (not all judges do) superb negotiating skills. He or she would be selected in advance – not at the heated time of the actual debate – by a bi-partisan commission (that we’ll call the “Cliff Commission”), so that everyone is satisfied with the Cliff Mediator’s neutrality and competence.
The Cliff Mediator would have to be intimately familiar with the kinds of issues that he is likely to be brought into – we can’t have a mediator who’s learning on the job. So, the appointment should be for a renewable term of, say, three years, and the Cliff Mediator should be furnished with a small non-partisan staff skilled in the ways of Washington and aware of the relative merits of the likely contentious items.
Once a Cliff Mediator is in place, the next question is in what situations he should be used. It would obviously be preferable if the various constituencies – the Administration, Senate Republicans and Democrats, House of Representatives Republicans and Democrats (I’ll refer to them collectively as the “Players”) – all decided that a particular situation was suited for mediation. But if the decision to utilize the Cliff Mediator required unanimity of all the Players, I’d be concerned that he wouldn’t be called upon as often as might be helpful.
On the other hand, it wouldn’t be appropriate for the Cliff Mediator himself to make the judgment that he should be used. This could cause resentment on the part of those who aren’t convinced he would be helpful in the particular circumstances; they might charge him with personal aggrandizement – injecting himself into matters where he wasn’t wanted.
The best way would be for the Cliff Commission to make the judgment as to whether the mediator would be useful in a certain situation. The process could originate with a request from one of the Players. (If all the Players wanted him, the Cliff Commission would simply comply.) If a Player opposed, there could be a hearing, after which the Cliff Commission could decide on whether using mediation was a good idea in this case or not.
The Cliff Mediator’s Function
So, let’s say a Cliff Mediator is in place and called upon by the Cliff Commission to function in a particular stand-off. What would he do? How could he improve the drill? Here are a half-dozen areas in which I believe his participation could be fruitful.
Early Communication. A real problem in recent Washington crises such as the fiscal cliff has been the lack of early communication among the Players. Rather, everything seems to happen in a mad rush as the deadline for action nears – last day, last hour, last minute. (This has a parallel in many unmediated commercial disputes, in which the parties are unable to strike an agreement until, as the expression goes, they’re on the courthouse steps – another good argument for using a mediator, so as to avoid the perils of that approach to companies carrying on their business.)
Needless to say, this isn’t a productive way to conduct the nation’s business – and not just because of the very real possibility of no deal being struck by the necessary deadline. As the crisis mounts without resolution, the uncertainty created has adverse effects on financial markets, business planning, public confidence, and so on – even if a deal finally manages to emerge at the last minute.
And those agreements that are reached at ten minutes to midnight on the deadline day aren’t usually models of effective legislation. Because the issues are complex and the conflicting views on them deeply held, the last minute deals – although getting us over the immediate hurdle – seldom do justice to the big picture. There’s not enough time to consider how what’s agreed upon fits in with other critical aspects of national life affected by it – the focus is entirely on meeting the deadline.
How much better and more productive it would be if things began early, without that overhang of impending doom. Here’s where a Cliff Mediator could be extremely helpful – prodding early discussion of the issues by the Players, sorting out questions to be covered, arranging for impartial financial estimates to be attached to various scenarios, and so on. Laying this sort of groundwork before everyone morphs into crisis mode could ease the way to ultimate agreements that have more far-reaching effect.
Buffer Between the Players. The Cliff Mediator can provide useful service as an interface between the Players. In unmediated commercial dispute negotiations, many of the problems arising can be attributed to foolish excessive actions by one side or the other that throw a monkey wrench into the works. Examples include premature “final” offers, dangerous bluffs, unwarranted threats that lead to counterthreats, and the like. That’s why I put my disputants in separate rooms, talk confidentially to each, shuttle between them but limit the information I convey back and forth. As a result of everyone having to deal with the mediator rather than with the other side, there’s a lot less posturing by parties than in direct negotiations.
This factor is obviously less controllable on the Washington scene – attempting to muzzle irrepressible politicians is no walk in the park. Still, a Cliff Mediator may be able to impose some order on this chaos – pointing out to participants the self-defeating nature of various actions they might be thinking of taking or of words they’re about to utter, suggesting alternative paths to accomplishing the advantages sought, delivering messages in a non-contentious fashion, and so on.
Initiating Ideas. Another key function of the Cliff Mediator arises through his status as the only person around without a horse in the race. Ideally, he doesn’t care where things end up, as long as it’s a rational solution that everyone can buy into. All the Players are looking at the issues through partisan lenses – trying to negotiate the most benefits and least detriments to their side. The Cliff Mediator, by contrast, is always looking for accommodation – what’s the most feasible solution for seeing things resolved? He can come up with ideas, suggest possible avenues for accommodation, float trial balloons, etc. – all of which may be difficult for a Player to do.
Here’s another aspect of this that could be especially useful. In a dispute, if one party proffers an idea to the other regarding a possible accommodation, the recipient is immediately skeptical of the motive behind it, which usually leads to a knee-jerk negative reaction. When I’m mediating such a dispute, however, I get the party to try the idea out on me. If I like it, I’ll often ask the party’s permission to present it to the other side as my own idea, since then there won’t be that knee-jerk negativism. This could work equally well in Washington.
Agent of Reality. Then there’s the mediator’s function as an agent of reality. The toughest aspect of settling a dispute is finding a number or formulation that satisfies both sides. As they say, it takes two to tango – and that “both sides” requirement doesn’t always seem to register with the hard-charging combatants.
So this becomes a prime chore of the mediator – to inject some realism into the process. I tell each of the parties to forget all that claptrap about win-win results – a real win for you would mean a loss for the other guy, to which he won’t agree, and I’ve got no power to make him do so. I remind them to face up to the fact that it’s sufficient to end up with a reasonably satisfactory outcome (to which the other side can agree) that is at least better than the alternative of litigating.
That would be true in Washington also. The Cliff Mediator is the one who has to tell a Player that the solution he’s pushing has no chance of being accepted by another of the key Players – so come off it. But look, the mediator can then say, here’s a variant of your solution that just might work. . . .
Advocate for Compromise. The Cliff Mediator can and should emphasize to all the Players the importance of compromise – how an effective compromise is an honorable result, very much in the nation’s best interest. Too often, it seems, the crazies monopolize the public reactions to compromise with mean-spirited putdowns, the use of terms like “sell-out” and such. Hey, the dictionary definition of “compromise” is “a settlement of differences in which each side makes concessions.” To me, a compromise – however messy or inelegant – that satisfies everyone enough to make the deal is one hell of an accomplishment. Somebody – and the mediator is the logical one – should be standing up tall for compromise.
Solution Proposer. Finally, in my mind, the greatest service a mediator can perform is when things bog down and the bargaining arteries have fossilized. That’s when a mediator is often called upon to recommend a specific rational resolution of the issue, and then to try to persuade each of the parties to accept it. If the Cliff Mediator is credibly neutral, this can have a big impact on lawmakers and administrators who are wrestling with a problem that they would like to solve but are having difficulty doing so. And it gives them neutral “cover” against partisan carping – since the proposal comes from someone with no ax to grind.
Obstacles to Effective Cliff Mediation
That’s the good side. But nothing worthwhile is ever that simple. There are serious potential obstacles to a cliff mediation, such as the following half-dozen that I’ll briefly mention.
Multiplicity of Players. Perhaps the biggest difficulty is how many different people would have to weigh in on the result. In my mediations, there’s typically one decision-maker per party. There are advisors aplenty that I also have to influence, but I know where the decision is going to be made and aim my fire accordingly. In Washington, however, there are 100 senators and 435 representatives, each with his or her own mindset on almost every issue and a reluctance to delegate to anyone else the right to strike a binding deal. And even the Administration doesn’t always speak with a single voice. Since it won’t be possible for everyone to be in on the crucial sessions, that leaves plenty of room for second-guessing, which could be fatal to a deal becoming effective.
The Influence of Constituents. Each of those senators and representatives has constituents to whom he or she is answerable on a political level. And what we’ve seen in recent years is how, in the many districts that are predictably red or blue (so there’s no electoral worry), the big problem for the incumbent is the potential primary opponent – someone who’s usually farther to the right or left than the Congressman is. This can lead to an irrationality of result – such as a willingness to go over the cliff rather than to strike a less-than-perfect deal.
Perceived Leverage. This one is especially troublesome, usually coming at a time (like the present) that is close to the results of a recent election. The Players who are winners perceive themselves to have positive leverage in any cliff negotiation, reasoning (even when this isn’t the case) that the election results constitute a mandate for the more extreme position they’ve been espousing. The essence of effective cliff mediation is the necessity to compromise, but these self-inflated people are less amenable to this than one would like to see.
Complexity of Issues. Rarely are the issues that would have to be dealt with in a cliff mediation simple or straight-forward or unconnected to other issues. Rather, the issues are complex and intertwined and difficult to deal with. This is not a reason to eschew the effort – but it complicates the search for a feasible compromise.
Big Mouths. These senators, representatives and administration officials aren’t used to being muzzled – they like to speak out. This makes for a situation that’s hard to control – yet it probably needs to be if the measured progress of the Cliff Mediator is to have any chance of success.
Public Attention. The rabid attention the public pays to what’s going on, spurred on by a frenzied media, may be the hallmark of a robust democracy, but it’s not helpful here. The fishbowl atmosphere, undermines any hope of proceeding more-or-less confidentially down productive paths.
So, What Do You Think?
I’ll tell you what I think – that the concept of putting a Cliff Mediator in place is worth having a serious dialogue about in Washington. Participants in those discussions would include representatives of the various Players, as well as some knowledgeable advocates of mediation. Let’s see how they come out. The idea won’t work unless everyone concerned decides to give it a chance – and I sincerely hope they will.
Let’s face it – the way we handle these matters nowadays is not efficient and often verges on disgraceful. This is something that needs fixing. Even with the difficulties noted, I haven’t heard any other ideas that hold out as much promise for improvement as the Cliff Mediator.
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This is the end of the old article . . . . Well, I won’t keep you in suspense as to what happened next, I make some limited efforts to get the article published by major press outlets – including chopping it down to op-ed size – but there were no takers.
I had solicited comments on the idea from a Washington insider friend, and the conclusions he reached were what I’m reasonably sure most Beltway types would echo (although perhaps less well put):
“I have observed the distinctions for decades now between the way things get done in the business world as compared to the political world. NYC v. DC , if you will. They are two very different animals. I recall that Don Regan was going to run the Reagan White House like a corporation and Bernie Nussbaum was going to be a corporate General Counsel in Clinton White House. Both very competent NY players who ended up on the return shuttle back to the Big Apple. The concern here is that the mediator himself becomes part of the political equation. He would likely become the football rather than the referee. Among other things , the football gets carried, passed, kicked, stripped and punted. I honestly don't see how the mediator is going to avoid that and allowed by the parties to become an honest broker.”
He concluded by saying that, nonetheless, “the article was worth putting out there.” But I considered his analysis to be sound, gave up the effort, and moved on to other things.
Late last month I contacted him once again to get his feelings on the subject. Was it worth another try? Here was his reply:
“Yes it is worth another try. Maybe more so than ever during the current gun control legislation . . . . I stand by my Nussbaum/Don Regan comment. A legal case resolution is a very different animal than legislation. It is not about money, but about power. Money is a divisible commodity, power is not. Even if a mediator is allowed in the room (highly doubtful), how a mediator maintains a referee role rather than becoming the football is far more difficult in a political setting than in a business setting.”
I also recently ran a draft of the article past another quite savvy observer of government in action. He thought the article was “fascinating” and that “adoption of the idea would be substantively wonderful”, but agreed with my Beltway insider friend as to the problem that was involved. Here is his observation:
“Very often in DC the adversaries do not desire a resolution - at least one side believes it gains more by the failure to reach resolution or by continuing to play to the more rabid segment of its political base than by reaching an accord. When the Republicans realized that some resolution/compromise on gun control was necessary politically, they rather quickly reached a compromise with their democratic opposition. Until that moment a mediator would not have been able to succeed - nor sought by the refusing party. Politics is also more often closer to a zero sum game than most of the business disputes/deals we are party to - which one way or another have a positive sum outcome as a possibility.”
I’ve recently been reading “JFK” by Fredrik Logevall, an interesting book about John Kennedy’s life prior to his presidency. It contains a fascinating discussion of how, during the period in the mid-‘50s when Kennedy was bed-ridden with serious maladies, he wrote (with Ted Sorensen’s assistance) the book “Profiles in Courage.” Alerted by some of Logevall’s observations, I got ahold of Kennedy’s book and read his observations bearing on the age-old problem of reaching agreement on difficult issues in the Washington hothouse.
Here’s what he said about compromise (which he referred to as “the sense of things possible”):
“We should not be too hasty in condemning all compromise as bad morals. For politics and legislation are not matters for inflexible principles or unattainable ideals. Politics, as John Morley has acutely observed, ‘is a field where action is one long second best, and where the choice constantly lies between two blunders’; and legislation, under the democratic way of life and the Federal system of Government, requires compromise between the desires of each individual and group and those around them . . . . Compromise need not mean cowardice. Indeed it is frequently the compromisers and conciliators who are faced with the severest tests of political courage as they oppose the extremist views of their constituents.”
In his final chapter discussing courage, Kennedy concluded as follows:
“Some demonstrated courage through their unyielding devotion to absolute principle. Others demonstrated courage through their acceptance of compromise, through their advocacy of conciliation, through their willingness to replace conflict with cooperation. Surely their courage was of equal quality, through of different caliber.”
And he left us with this reference:
“[N]ine years in Congress have taught me the wisdom of Lincoln’s words: ‘There are few things wholly evil or wholly good. Almost everything, especially of Government policy, is an inseparable compound of the two, so that our best judgment of the preponderance between them is continually demanded.’ ”
So, what do you think – is it worth another try in 2022?
